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\begin{document}
%
% paper title
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% \title{An efficient data hiding process guaranteeing anonymity through the Internet\\ Stego-security and robustness}
%\title{About the contribution of the AND team to an anomymity through
%internet.}
\title{Application of the steganography for the anonymization through
internet.\\Other application framework.}



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\author{\IEEEauthorblockN{Jacques M. Bahi, Jean-Fran\c cois Couchot, Nicolas
Friot, and  Christophe Guyeux*}

\IEEEauthorblockA{FEMTO-ST Institute, CNRS, UMR 6174\\
Computer Science Laboratory DISC\\
University of Franche-Comt\'{e}\\
Besan\c con, France\\
\{jacques.bahi, jfcouchot, nicolas.friot, christophe.guyeux\}@femto-st.fr}\\
* Authors in alphabetic order\\
}

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%Homer Simpson\IEEEauthorrefmark{2},
%James Kirk\IEEEauthorrefmark{3}, 
%Montgomery Scott\IEEEauthorrefmark{3} and
%Eldon Tyrell\IEEEauthorrefmark{4}}
%\IEEEauthorblockA{\IEEEauthorrefmark{1}School of Electrical and Computer Engineering\\
%Georgia Institute of Technology,
%Atlanta, Georgia 30332--0250\\ Email: see http://www.michaelshell.org/contact.html}
%\IEEEauthorblockA{\IEEEauthorrefmark{2}Twentieth Century Fox, Springfield, USA\\
%Email: homer@thesimpsons.com}
%\IEEEauthorblockA{\IEEEauthorrefmark{3}Starfleet Academy, San Francisco, California 96678-2391\\
%Telephone: (800) 555--1212, Fax: (888) 555--1212}
%\IEEEauthorblockA{\IEEEauthorrefmark{4}Tyrell Inc., 123 Replicant Street, Los Angeles, California 90210--4321}}




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\maketitle


\begin{abstract}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{TODO}}

\end{abstract}


\begin{IEEEkeywords}
Anonymity; privacy; Internet; Information hiding; Chaotic iterations.
\end{IEEEkeywords}


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\section{Introduction}\label{sec:intro}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{TODO}}\newline
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{(6 pages)}}

Indications : 

\begin{itemize}
  \item Anonymat sur internet
  \item Tor et Perseus (Eric Filiol a attaque Tor, il existe donc des attaques
  visant Tor )
  \item Tor et Perseus s'appuient tous deux sur une architecture réseau de 500
  machines. On effectue des rebonds, puis au final un noeud (aléatoire) fait la
  requête
  \item Il existe un plugin Firefox pour Perseus. Perseus a pour objectif de
  contrer la loi Hadopi. L'idee est que monsieur tout le monde ne doit pas
  savoir ce que je fait sur internet, les copains ne doivent pas savoir qui fait
  quoi, en revanche l'armee a quant a elle cette possibilite. (pseudo-anonymite)
\end{itemize}

Structure de l'intro:

\textbf{§1: Pourquoi être anonyme sur internet:}

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Printemps arabe
  \item liberte d'expression
  \item eviter aux journalistes (reporters) d'avoir des problemes
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{§2: Quelques solutions classiques:}


\begin{enumerate}
  \item Tor
  \item Perseus
  \item Proxys etrangers
  \item \ldots
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{§3: une autre approche possible: la steganographie}

Problème: avec les proxys on s'appuie sur des entreprises dont on ne connait
finalement rien, ainsi on déplace le problème et on est force de faire confiance
à l'entreprise.

Avec Tor et Perseus, nous ne disposons que de 2 outils (c'est très peu)
fonctionnat sur un meme principe. Ainsi il est facile pour des attaquants ou des
gouvernements de concentrer tout leurs efforts sur ces outils. Il est donc
malsain d'avoir peu d'outils. En effet, en cas de faille de securite importante
(qui peut apparaitre a tout moment), ou en cas de gosse attaque, nous avons
besoin d'une solution de repli, un plan B. La steganographie semble etre un
candidat ideale pour le plan B.

\textbf{§4: comment utiliser la steganographie pour mettre en oeuvre
l'anonymisation}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{INCLURE DES REFERENCES: Qui a déjà exploité la
stéganographie pour l'anonymisation}}

Le but de cet article n'est pas de decrire precisement et techniquement comment
implementer les procedes, MAIS d'expliquer ou on en est aujourd hui pour evaluer
la securite des processus de dissimulation d'informations. On donnera quand meme
quelques exemples d'implementations concretes (canal de communication secret,
dissimulation de secrets dans les images de fond d ecrans de sites web,
galeries photo  sur facebook, jouer sur les espaces dans les codes sources
HTML, inserer des donnees secretes dans un flux audio ou video).


\textbf{§5: Plan}
\section{Basic Reminders}\label{sec:basic-reminders}
\subsection{The Most and Least Significant
Coefficients}\label{sec:msc-lsc}



We first notice that terms of the original content $x$ that may be replaced by terms issued
from the watermark $y$ are less important than other: they could be changed 
without be perceived as such. More generally, a 
\emph{signification function} 
attaches a weight to each term defining a digital media,
depending on its position $t$.

\begin{definition}
A \emph{signification function} is a real sequence 
$(u^k)^{k \in \mathds{N}}$. % with a limit equal to 0.
\end{definition}


\begin{example}\label{Exemple LSC}
Let us consider a set of    
grayscale images stored into portable graymap format (P3-PGM):
each pixel ranges between 256 gray levels, \textit{i.e.},
is memorized with eight bits.
In that context, we consider 
$u^k = 8 - (k  \mod  8)$  to be the $k$-th term of a signification function 
$(u^k)^{k \in \mathds{N}}$. 
Intuitively, in each group of eight bits (\textit{i.e.}, for each pixel) 
the first bit has an importance equal to 8, whereas the last bit has an
importance equal to 1. This is compliant with the idea that
changing the first bit affects more the image than changing the last one.
\end{example}

\begin{definition}%[Significance of coefficients]
\label{def:msc-lsc}
Let $(u^k)^{k \in \mathds{N}}$ be a signification function, 
$m$ and $M$ be two reals s.t. $m < M$. 
\begin{itemize}
\item The \emph{most significant coefficients (MSCs)} of $x$ is the finite 
  vector  $$u_M = \left( k ~ \big|~ k \in \mathds{N} \textrm{ and } u^k 
    \geqslant M \textrm{ and }  k \le \mid x \mid \right);$$
 \item The \emph{least significant coefficients (LSCs)} of $x$ is the 
finite vector 
$$u_m = \left( k ~ \big|~ k \in \mathds{N} \textrm{ and } u^k 
  \le m \textrm{ and }  k \le \mid x \mid \right);$$
 \item The \emph{passive coefficients} of $x$ is the finite vector 
   $$u_p = \left( k ~ \big|~ k \in \mathds{N} \textrm{ and } 
u^k \in ]m;M[ \textrm{ and }  k \le \mid x \mid \right).$$
 \end{itemize}
 \end{definition}

For a given host content $x$,
MSCs are then ranks of $x$  that describe the relevant part
of the image, whereas LSCs translate its less significant parts.

\begin{example}
These two definitions are illustrated on Figure~\ref{fig:MSCLSC}, where the
significance function $(u^k)$ is defined as in Example \ref{Exemple LSC}, $M=5$,
and $m=6$.

\begin{figure}[htb]


\begin{minipage}[b]{.98\linewidth}
  \centering
  \centerline{\includegraphics[width=3.cm]{img/lena512}}
   %\centerline{\epsfig{figure=img/lena512.pdf,width=4cm}}
  \centerline{(a) Original Lena.}
\end{minipage}
\begin{minipage}[b]{.49\linewidth}
  \centering
    \centerline{\includegraphics[width=3.cm]{img/lena_msb_678}}
   %\centerline{\epsfig{figure=img/lena_msb_678.pdf,width=4cm}}
  \centerline{(b) MSCs of Lena.}
\end{minipage}
\hfill
\begin{minipage}[b]{0.49\linewidth}
  \centering
    \centerline{\includegraphics[width=3.cm]{img/lena_lsb_1234_facteur17}}
  
 %\centerline{\epsfig{figure=img/lena_lsb_1234_facteur17.pdf,width=4cm}}
  \centerline{(c) LSCs of Lena ($\times 17$).}
\end{minipage}
%
\caption{Most and least significant coefficients of Lena.}
\label{fig:MSCLSC}
%
\end{figure}
\end{example}


\section{Some Steganography Approches}
\input{stegoart}



\section{Our theoretical contributions since 2008}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Section à supprimer d'après Jean-Francois}}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Les differentes definitions et niveaux de securite:
  \begin{itemize}
    \item stego-security
    \item topological-security
    \item complexity approach similar to that adopted in cryptography)
    \item Classes d'attaques WOA \ldots
    \end{itemize}
  \item Grace a la machine de Turing, on peut toujours evaluer la
  securite-topologique
\end{itemize}

\section{Some well known steganographic tools.}

\subsection{Jessica Fridrich 1}
\subsection{Jessica Fridrich 2}
\subsection{$\mathcal{DI}_1$}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{On ne prétend pas être meilleur que les autres algo,
on propose simplement au nouvel algo}}

$\mathcal{DI}_1$ est plus rapide mais moins sur que $\mathcal{CIS}_2$.

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Faire une étude de complexité de $\mathcal{DI}_1$}}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{TODO: rédiger l'algo de $\mathcal{DI}_1$ correspondant
au programme.}}


\begin{algorithm}
%\DontPrintSemicolon
\KwData{$G=(X,U)$ such that $G^{tc}$ is an order.}
\KwResult{$G’=(X,V)$ with $V\subseteq U$ such that $G’^{tc}$ is an
interval order.}
\Begin{
$V \longleftarrow U$\;
$S \longleftarrow \emptyset$\;
\For{$x\in X$}{
$NbSuccInS(x) \longleftarrow 0$\;
$NbPredInMin(x) \longleftarrow 0$\;
$NbPredNotInMin(x) \longleftarrow |ImPred(x)|$\;
}
\For{$x \in X$}{
\If{$NbPredInMin(x) = 0$ {\bf and} $NbPredNotInMin(x) = 0$}{
$AppendToMin(x)$}
}
\nl\While{$S \neq \emptyset$}{\label{InRes1}
\nlset{REM} remove $x$ from the list of $T$ of maximal index\;\label{InResR}
\lnl{InRes2}\While{$|S \cap ImSucc(x)| \neq |S|$}{
\For{$ y \in S-ImSucc(x)$}{
\{ remove from $V$ all the arcs $zy$ : \}\;
\For{$z \in ImPred(y) \cap Min$}{
remove the arc $zy$ from $V$\;
$NbSuccInS(z) \longleftarrow NbSuccInS(z) - 1$\;
move $z$ in $T$ to the list preceding its present list\;
\{i.e. If $z \in T[k]$, move $z$ from $T[k]$ to
$T[k-1]$\}\;
}
$NbPredInMin(y) \longleftarrow 0$\;
$NbPredNotInMin(y) \longleftarrow 0$\;
$S \longleftarrow S - \{y\}$\;
$AppendToMin(y)$\;
}
}
$RemoveFromMin(x)$\;
}
}
\caption{IntervalRestriction\label{IR}}
\end{algorithm}


\section{Concrete evaluation of data hiding processes}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{SECTION A FUSIONNER AVEC EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION}}

\subsection{Spread-spectrum : NW, CW, (cf article de Cayre et Bas)\ldots}

All the different variant of the spread spectrum techniques (Natural
Watermarking, Circular Watermarking, \ldots) are topologically-secure. ( Each
spread spectrum variant correspond to an other choice of the initial condition
for the common topological model (cf these CG)).

But the major problem consists in the fact that any variant is expansive.

\subsection{Watermarking by chaotic iterations: $\mathcal{CIW}_1$}

\subsection{Steganography by chaotic iterations: $\mathcal{CIS}_2$}


\subsection{Simple steganography by chaotic iterations: $\mathcal{DI}_1$}


\subsection{$\epsilon$-security and topological-security}


$\epsilon$-security et topological-security de toute fonction qui verifie
certaines proprietes (matrice d'adjacence doublement stochastique, etc\ldots)


\subsection{Comparison}


\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Indiquer quel algo utiliser pour quelle application}}

The comparison between the currently only stego and chaos secure schemes is
synthesized in
Table~\ref{table:security-processes-comparison}.\newline 

\newcolumntype{V}{>{\centering\arraybackslash} m{1cm} }
%\resizebox{8cm}{!} {
\begin{table}
\begin{center}
%\begin{tabularx}{8cm}{|c|V|V|V|V|}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}\cline{2-3}
  \hline
   & \multirow{2}{*}{\textbf{KOA}} & \multirow{2}{*}{\textbf{KMA}} &
   \multirow{2}{*}{\textbf{WOA}} & \multirow{2}{*}{\textbf{CMA}} &
   \textbf{Bits}\\ & & & & & \textbf{embeded}\\
  \hline
    \hline
  
  \textbf{$\mathcal{NW}$ \tiny($\eta=1$)}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-normal-jaune}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-normal-jaune}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/interrogation}}
     &
  N
   \\
         \hline
   
  \textbf{$\mathcal{CIW}_1$} &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}} 
   &
  1
  \\

      \hline
   
   \hline
   \textbf{$\mathcal{CIS}_2$} &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
     &
  N
  \\
      \hline
   \textbf{$\mathcal{DI}_1$} &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-normal-jaune}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-normal-jaune}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-sourire-vert}}
  &
  \parbox[c]{0.4cm}{\includegraphics[width=0.5cm]{img/smiley-normal-jaune}}
     &
  N
  \\
  \hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{$\mathcal{NW}$, $\mathcal{CIW}_1$, $\mathcal{CIW}_1$,
and $\mathcal{DI}_1$ security. Embedding capacity.}
\label{table:security-processes-comparison}
\end{center}

\end{table}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{$\mathcal{DI}_1$ is less secure than the others but it
is more easy and seems to be more quick.}}


\section{Experimental evaluations}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{DANS CETTE SECTION ON VA EVALUER LA ROBUSTESSE DE
$\mathcal{DI}_1$ }}

\subsection{Presentation of the
architecture}\label{section:architecture-presentation}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{A ADAPTER}}
Computations have been
performed on the supercomputer facilities of the Mésocentre de calcul de Franche-Comt\'{e}.

In order to take benefits of parallelism, we have used Jace~\cite{bhm09:ip}, a
grid-enabled programming and execution environment allowing a simple and efficient implementation 
of parallel and distributed applications. Roughly speaking, Jace builds a virtual parallel machine by 
connecting a set of heterogeneous and distant computers.
It schedules tasks, executes them, and returns results to the user. It
also proposes a simple programming interface for the implementation of applications
using a message passing model.

In our case, tasks are independent Python programs with different parameters. Jace takes care to execute them in parallel ensuring optimal load balancing and fault tolerance.

For these experiments we have used HPC resources 
from Mesocentre of Franche-Comt\'{e}. This platform 
is currently composed of 720 cores with 11 TeraFLOPS of power.

The different tests have been realized on several images from the Wikimedia
Commons repository~\cite{wiki:wikimedia-commons}.


\textbf{FAIRE AUSSI DES TESTS AVEC LA BASE DE BOSS}
The conditions of all tests are described for each one in the caption of the graph result.

\subsection{Tests realized}\label{sec:tests-realized-ci-1}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{A ADAPTER}}

In this section, it is studied the robustness of the watermarking process
$CI_1$. To do this, it has been executed two test batteries in order to evaluate
the evolution of the bytes difference rate in function of the geometrical
attacks parameters, between the watermark inserted and the watermark extracted
after the attack.

In the first battery of tests we have used the same embedding key (a constant
strategy,the same strategy has been used to watermark all the
images in this test) to embed the watermark. In the second battery of tests,
in order to see the influence of the embedding key on the robustness, we have embedded all
the watermark with strategies generated randomly(a
different strategy has been used to watermark each image). 

To obtain the following results, we have realized a great number of attacks on
600 images, and we have traced for each attack, two graphics (average and
standard deviation), in order to determine the acceptability
threshold for our watermarking process $CI_1$.

\subsection{Tests results}\label{sec:tests-results-ci-1}

The exhaustive list of the geometrical attacks tested and the
corresponding graphs results is following:

\begin{enumerate}
  %\item \textbf{Robustness facing a resizing attack.}\\
%   See   Figure~\ref{fig:resizing-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:resizing-attack-constant-strategy}.
%   \item \textbf{Robustness facing a JPEG attack.}\\See
%   Figure~\ref{fig:jpeg-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:jpeg-attack-constant-strategy}.
%   \item \textbf{Robustness facing a Gaussian blur
%   attack.}\\See
%   Figure~\ref{fig:gaussian-blur-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:gaussian-blur-attack-constant-strategy}.
  \item \textbf{Robustness facing a rotation
  attack.}\\See
  Figure~\ref{fig:rotation-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:rotation-attack-constant-strategy}.
%   \item \textbf{Robustness facing a  blur
%   attack.}\\See
%   Figure~\ref{fig:blur-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:blur-attack-constant-strategy}.
  \item \textbf{Robustness facing a contrast
  attack.}\\See
  Figure~\ref{fig:contrast-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:contrast-attack-constant-strategy}.
%   \item \textbf{Robustness facing a cropping
%   attack.}\\See
%   Figure~\ref{fig:cropping-attack-constant-strategy}~\vpageref{fig:cropping-attack-constant-strategy}.
\end{enumerate}

\textcolor{red}{\textbf{METTRE LES BONNES COURBES UNE FOIS LES TESTS FAITS}}


\begin{figure*}[htb]
\begin{minipage}[b]{.45\linewidth}
  \centering
    \centerline{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{graphs/graph_4_attack=rotation-average}}
    \centerline{(a) Average}
\end{minipage}
\hfill
\begin{minipage}[b]{0.45\linewidth}
  \centering
    \centerline{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{graphs/graph_4_attack=rotation-sd}}
    \centerline{(b) Standard deviation}
\end{minipage}
\caption{Robustness of $\mathcal{DI}_1$ facing a rotation attack.(50 images and
constant strategy)}
\label{fig:rotation-attack-constant-strategy}
\end{figure*}


\begin{figure*}[htb]
\begin{minipage}[b]{.45\linewidth}
  \centering
    \centerline{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{graphs/graph_6_attack=contraste-average}}
    \centerline{(a) Average}
\end{minipage}
\hfill
\begin{minipage}[b]{0.45\linewidth}
  \centering
    \centerline{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{graphs/graph_6_attack=contraste-sd}}
    \centerline{(b) Standard deviation}
\end{minipage}
\caption{Robustness of $\mathcal{DI}_1$ facing a contrast attack.(50 images and constant
strategy)}
\label{fig:contrast-attack-constant-strategy}
\end{figure*}



\begin{itemize}
  \item Tests de robustesse
  \item Tableaux de mesures
\end{itemize}

\begin{remark}
Cette derniere partie peut aussi faire office de conclusion. On explique que
l'on a pas encore aborde les aspects experimentaux lies a la robustesse
(travaux futures)
\end{remark}

\section{TITRE: cf proposition de JFC}


\section{Conclusion and future works}

%\bibliographystyle{finplain}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{jabref}


\end{document}


